By the time the ground war began on 24 February, much of the Iraqi infrastructure and war machine lay in ruins, both in Iraq and in Kuwait. Command and control centers had been pounded again and again, as had airfields, communications centers, electrical facilities, and more. In addition, front-line Iraqi troops and armored vehicles had not been spared from the aerial assault. During night missions in late January, F-111F crews discovered that their Pave Tack forward- looking infrared radar equipment could detect buried and camouflaged tanks in the rapidly cooling desert, providing inviting targets for the Aardvark’s GBU-12 laser-guided bombs. F-15E aircraft and the venerable A-10 also proved adept at “tank plinking.” Iraqi ground troops, meanwhile, suffered continual bombardment beginning on the first day of the air war. After only 4 days of fighting, coalition forces liberated Kuwait City, capital of Kuwait. President Bush, aware of the limitations of the UN mandate (to expel Iraq from Kuwait) and sensitive to the political realities of the coalition, ended the ground war on 28 February with American, French, and British forces well into Iraq.
During the 44 days of Operation Desert Storm, air power proved to be crucial; the United States Air Force was the primary contributor of this air power. Air superiority was achieved after 1 day of fighting, air supremacy a little more than a week later. More significantly, Iraq’s ability to wage war was seriously undermined after the first night; and, by the time the coalition’s ground war began, its army lay nearly prostrate. The Air Force flew 60 percent of the sorties flown in Operation Desert Storm. While the victory was not without cost, 21 aircraft crashed and 34 Air Force personnel died in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These losses were exceedingly low given the magnitude of the operation.
Operation Allied Force—Kosovo (1999)
The conclusion of Operations Deliberate Force and Deny Flight in Bosnia did not mean the end to strife in the region. After revoking the province of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, the Serbian government slowly began to oppress its ethnic Albanian population. That oppression eventually turned to violence and mass killings, and the international community began to negotiate with Serbian leaders in the spring of 1998 for a solution acceptable to all parties. The Serbs, led by President Slobodan Milosevic, considered the matter an internal one. A last-ditch effort to negotiate a settlement began in January 1999 at Rambouillet, France; but, following a large offensive against Albanian civilians in March, talks broke down.
Wanting to prevent a repeat of the “ethnic cleansing” that took place in Bosnia, NATO forces began flying operations on 24 March 1999 to force Serbia to accept NATO terms for ending the conflict in Kosovo. Given the name Operation Allied Force, NATO leaders hoped Milosevic would capitulate after just a few days of air strikes demonstrated NATO resolve. That was not the case. It would take 78 days and over 38,000 sorties in the air war over Serbia (AWOS) for NATO to secure its objective.
Planning for the air campaign began in May 1998. Unlike Deny Flight, which required strike approval from UN authorities and proved largely unworkable, NATO ran the AWOS. While Allied planners worked on how an air campaign would work, separate Air Force planning also proceeded concurrently. The desire to protect critical stealth technologies and tactics drove the separate planning. NATO target lists were limited because planners believed the campaign would not last.
When the AWOS began, about 50 targets were available; the list would grow significantly as the campaign wore on. Initial targets included air defense systems and command and control facilities. Two hundred and fourteen Allied aircraft, to include 112 from the United States, supported Allied Force when the “limited air response option” began, including the United States Air Force B-52s based at RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom and B-2s out of Whiteman AFB MO. These bombers were the first aircraft to launch in support of Operation Allied Force.
Serbian opposition proved more stubborn than Allied Force planners initially calculated. Milosevic believed that he could withstand air strikes, force ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, and fracture the coalition. Serbia was attacking the coalition’s will to fight. After 4 or 5 days of bombing, it became apparent to Allied war fighters that Serbia was not going to buckle.
